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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MADGE FREDRICKSON, 
Pla'intiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, SEAGULL MOTEL and 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defenda;nts. 
Case No. 
10785 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants agree with the plaintiff's Statement 
of .B'acts; however, feel that the following amplification 
should be made: 
Plaintiff suffered an injury during the course of 
her employment on July 9, 1959, which was compensable 
nuder the Workmen's Compensation Act. The last pay-
ment of compensation made by the defendant was on 
.January 26, 1960. The only application filed by the plain-
tiff before The Industrial Commission was that filed on 
Nonmber 12, 1965 (R. 7). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM WAS BARRED. 
Plaintiff states in her brief that the only issue pre-
sented to The Industrial Commission in the hearing on 
which this appeal is taken was whether or not the cause 
of action against the employer-defendant commenced 
from the time of the accident or the time the extent of 
the industrial injury became apparent. The defendants 
agree that this was the issue presented to The Industrial 
Commission. 
The Hearing Examiner based his decision denying 
plaintiff benefits on Sec. 35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. This statute is entitled ''Notice of Injury 
and Claim for Compensation - Limitation of Action." 
This section basically defines the employee's obligation 
in making proper notice of his injury. The statute reads 
in part as follows: 
"35-1-99 . . . If no notice of the accident and 
injury is given to the employer within one year 
from the date of the accident, the right to com-
pensation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for 
compensation is filed with the Industrial Com-
mission within three years from the date of the 
accident or the date ~f the last payment of com-
pensation, the right to compensation shall be 
wholly barred.'' 
2 
The Hearing Examiner relied upon the last sentence 
set forth above in ruling that the plaintiff's claim was 
barred. 
The plaintiff in her brief relies solely on the Utah 
case of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 93 Ut. 
510, 74 P.2d 657. This case involved a situation where 
the applicant received compensation; however, he be-
lieved that his injury had healed and claimed no com-
pensation within six years. The issue presented to the 
Court, therefore, was when the cause of action com-
menced. The Court held, as stated by the plaintiff, that 
the cause of action commences when the industrial in-
jury becomes apparent and a claim is made and the 
employer or insurance carrier refuses to pay compen-
sation. The Court, in determining the issue, construed 
statutes which were part of the Compensation Code of 
1937. The Court examined Sec. 104-2-26 R. S. Utah 1933, 
which was a general statute of limitation section appear-
ing in the Code of Civil Procedure. This statute reads 
in part: 
"Within one year: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. An action against a municipal corporation for 
damages or injury to property caused by a mob 
or riot.'' 
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Subsequent to this case, the Legislature amended 42-1-92 
R. S. Utah 1933 and said amendment is found in 42-1-92 
U.C.A. 1943. The amendment to the statute was by the 
addition of the following sentence: 
"If no claim for compensation is filed with The 
Industrial Commission within three years from 
the date of the accitlent or the date of the last 
payment of compensation, the right to compen-
sation shall he wholly barred." 
The Legislature, therefore, specifically set forth a limita-
tion of action provision which provided for Workmen's 
Compensation cases and which would he controlfoig-
rather than the general statute of limitation section 0f 
the Code of Civil Procedure relied upon by the Conrt 
in Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commissiou, supra. 'rhe 
language of this amendment is clt>ar, that is, that the 
applicant is barred unless ther0 is a filing with The 
Industrial Commission within three years from the 
date of accident or from the date of the last payment of 
compensation. As mentioned above, it is clear and it is 
not disputed by plaintiff in this case that the first filing 
with The Industrial Commission was on N owmber 12, 
1965, more than five years and nine months later than 
the last compensation payment received on Jan nary 26, 
1960, based upon an accident that occurred on July 0, 
1959. 
Our Supreme Court has considered th(_• statute in 
question, that is, 35-1-99 U.C.A. 19fl3, as am0nclcd, in 
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McKee vs. Industrial Commission, 115 Ut. 550, 206 P.2d 
715. The Court stated that the sole question to be deter-
mined is whether or not this particular section (then 
known as Sec. 42-1-92 U.C.A. 1943, as amended,) was an 
effective right to bar plaintiff's recovery for compen-
sation. In this case, the employee had experienced back 
difficulties during the period of time that the statute of 
limitations was running. The plaintiff argued, however, 
that he did not have knowledge of the extent of the 
injury until after the statute had run. It was conceded 
that more than three years had expired from the time 
of the accident until the application for compensation 
was filed with The Industrial Commission. The appli-
cant claimed that the rule set down in Salt Lake City vs. 
Industrial Commission, supra, was controlling and that 
the cause of action did not arise until the extent of the 
injury became known and the denial of the payment 
was made by the employer or the insurance carrier. The 
applicant was claiming under almost identical fact situ-
ations the same position contended by the plaintiff in 
this cause. The Court, however, at page 658 of the 
Pacific Reporter held as follows: 
'' ... He contends, however, that the statute did 
not begin to run against him until 1947 when he 
learned for the first time that his suffering was 
uot the result of rheumatism or lumbago. In so 
arguing, he relies upon the rule. a~110unced in 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm1ss1on, 93 Utah 
5 
510, 74 P.2d 657, and Williams v. Industrial Com-
mission, 95 Utah 376, 81 P.2d 649. These cases 
overruled a line of cases from this court which 
had held that Sec. 104-2-26, Rev. St. 1933, a one 
year general statute of limitations, commenced 
to run on industrial accidents from the time of 
the accident. In the cited cases we held that to 
follow the rule announced in the earlier cases 
might permit the statute to run before a cause 
of action accrued inasmuch as an employer's duty 
to pay under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
did not arise until there was an accident an<l in-
jury and a disability or loss from the injury. We 
therefore held that the time prescribed in Sec. 
104-2-26 U.C.A. 1943, would start to run from 
the time an employee's cause of action arose and 
not from the time of the accident. 
"(1) Subsequent to these cases and in 1939, the 
legislature of this state enacted a statute of limi-
tations which dealt specifical1y with actions 
arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
This statute is 42-1-92, U.C.A. 1943, which is 
hereinbefore set forth and which provides that 
unless an application for compensation is filed 
with the Industrial Commission within three 
years from the date of the accident or the date 
of the last payment of compensation the right to 
comp ens a ti on is barred. The language of the 
statute is clear and leaves no room for doubt. 
Regardless of the decisions rendered by this 
court prior to 1939, the law now is that the 
limitation statute begins to run from the date 
of the accident or from the date of the last pay-
ment of compensation.'' 
The Court held that the legislative enactment which is 
found in 42-1-92 U.C.A. 1943, as amended, negates thr 
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holding m Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission 
' 
supra. 
It is conceded that the employer or the insurance 
carrier can waive by its actions the right to the defense 
of this limitation. See McKee vs. Industrial Commission 
' 
supra, and Utah Apex Mining Co. vs. Industrial, Com-
mission, 116 Ut. 305, 209 P.2d 571. There is no evidence 
in this record, nor is it contended by plaintiff, that any 
such facts exist in this case. 
In a recent Utah case, Jones vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 17 Ut. 238, 404 P.2d 27, this Court affirmed an 
Order of The Industrial Commission denying benefits 
based upon 35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, on the 
grounds that the petitioner had not filed within the 
applicable three-year limitation and the Court stated 
that the provisions of this statute showed a clear and 
obvious legislative intent. 
It should be noted that 35-1-100 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, protects the applicant from the situation where 
the extent of the injuries are not known or not apparent. 
1'he applicant is required to make a filing and with this 
filing he oonfers jurisdiction upon The Industrial Com-
mission and if the injury lights up in the future, the 
;\ rpliennt is protected. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission did not err in holding that 35-l-D9 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended, requires that an applicant is 
barred from receiving compensation if no claim is filed 
with it within either three years from the date of the 
accident or the date of the last payment of compensation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
422 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants 
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